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Death Penalty Comparison Chart
Chart Comparing Washington Laws to those Recommended by the Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment
As Reported on April 15, 2002: some of the recommendations may be followed in specific counties, municipalities, and/or agencies, but may not be utilized or followed throughout the State.
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction and Background
CHAPTER 2 - Police and Pretrial Investigations
CHAPTER 3 - DNA and Forensic Testing
CHAPTER 4 - Eligibility for Capital Punishment
CHAPTER 5 - Prosecutors' Selection of Cases for Capital Punishment
CHAPTER 6 - Trial Judges
CHAPTER 7 - Trial Lawyers
CHAPTER 8 - Pretrial Proceedings
CHAPTER 9 - Guilt-Innocence Phase
CHAPTER 10 - The Sentencing Phase
CHAPTER 11 - Imposition of Sentence
CHAPTER 12 - Proceedings following conviction and sentence
CHAPTER 13 - Funding
CHAPTER 14 - General Recommendations
| CHAPTER 1 - Introduction and Background | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| CHAPTER 2 - Police and Pretrial Investigations | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #1: After a suspect has been identified, the police should continue to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards or away from the suspect. | Not Met | |||
| #2: a) The police must list on schedules all existing items of relevant evidence, including exculpatory evidence and their location; b) record-keeping obligations must be assigned to specific police officers or employees, who must certify their compliance in writing to the prosecutor; c) the police must give copies of the schedules to the prosecution; d) The police must give the prosecutor access to all investigatory materials in their possession. | Not Met | |||
| #3: In death eligible case, representation by the public defender during a custodial interrogation should be authorized by the Illinois legislature when a suspect requests the advise of counsel, and where there is a reasonable belief that the suspect is indigent. To the extent that there is some doubt about the indigency of the suspect, police should resolve the doubt in favor of allowing the suspect access to the public defender. | Somewhat Met | Case law and Criminal Rules (CR) | CrR 3.1(c) (1) states: When a person is taken into custody that person shall immediately be advised of the right to a lawyer. Such advise shall be made in words easily understood, and it shall be stated expressly that a person who is unable to pay a lawyer is entitled to have one provided without charge. (2) At the earliest opportunity a person in custody who desires a lawyer shall be provide access to a telephone, the telephone number of the public defender or official responsible for assigning a lawyer, and any other means necessary to place the person in communication with a lawyer. | |
| #4: Custodial interrogations of a suspect in a homicide case occurring at a police facility should be videotaped. Videotaping should not include merely the statement made by the suspect after interrogation, but the entire interrogation process. | Not Met | |||
| #5: Any statements by a homicide suspect which are not recorded should be repeated to the suspect on tape, and his or her comments recorded. | Not Met | |||
| #6: There are circumstances in which videotaping may not be practical, and some uniform method of recording such interrogations, such as tape recording, should be established, Police investigators should carry tape recorders for use when interviewing suspects in homicide cases outside the station, and all such interviews should be audiotaped. | Not Met | |||
| #7: The Illinois Eavesdropping Act (720 ILCS5/14) should be amended to permit police taping of statements without the suspects' knowledge or consent in order to enable the videotaping and audiotaping of statements as recommended by the Commission. The amendment should apply only to homicide cases, where the suspect is aware that the person asking the questions is a police officer. | Not Met | RCW 9.73.090: | RCW 9.73.090: Tape-recorded statements must comply with RCW 9.73.090. RCW 9.73.090(1)(b) states: "Video and/or sound recordings may be made of arrested persons by police officers responsible for making arrests or holding person in custody before their first appearance in court. Such video and/or sound recordings shall conform strictly to the following: i) The arrested person shall be informed that such recording is being made and the statement so informing him shall be included in the recording; ii) The recording shall commence with an indication of the time of the beginning thereof and terminate with an indication of the time thereof; iii) At the commencement of the recording the arrested person shall be fully informed of his constitutional rights, and such statements informing him shall be included in the recording and iv) The recording shall only be used for valid police or court activities. |
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| #8: The police should electronically record interviews conducted of significant witness in homicide cases where it is reasonably foreseeable that their testimony may be challenged at trial. | Not Met | |||
| #9: Police should be required to make a reasonable attempt to determine the suspect's mental capacity before interrogation, and if a suspect is determined to be mentally retarded, the police should be limited to asking nonleading questions and prohibited from implying that they believe the suspect is guilty. | Not Met | |||
| #10: When practicable, police departments should insure that the person who conducts the lineup or photospread should not be aware of which member of the lineup or photo spread is the suspect. | Not Met | |||
| #11 (a) Eyewitness should be told explicitly that the suspected perpetrator might not be in the lineup or photospread, and therefore they should not feel that they must make an identification. (b) Eyewitnesses should also be told that they should not assume that the person administering the lineup or photospread know which person is the suspect in the case. | Not Met | |||
| #12: If the administrator of the lineup/photospread does not know who is the suspect is, a sequential procedure should be used, so that the eyewitness views only one lineup member or photo at a time and makes a decision (that is the perpetrator or that is not the perpetrator) regarding each person before viewing another lineup member or photo. | Not Met | |||
| #13: Suspects should not stand out in the lineup or photo spread as being different from the distractors, based on the eyewitnesses' previous description of the perpetrator, or based on other factors that would draw attention to the suspect. | Somewhat met | Case law | First, a defendant asserting that a police identification procedure denied him due process must show that the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. State v. Traweek, 43 Wn.App. 99, 103, 715 P.2d 1148 (1986)(citing Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 22 L.Ed. 2d. 402, 89 S.Ct. 1127 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L.Ed. 2D 1199, 87 S.Ct. 1967 (1967)). Then, if the defendant makes such a showing, the court reviews the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the suggestiveness created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id., 43 Wn.App. at 103 (citing Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 53 L.Ed. 2d 140, 97 S.Ct. 223 (1977); State v Hewett, 86 Wn.2d 487, 545 P.2d 1201 (1976)). | |
| #14: A clear written statement should be made of any statements made by the eyewitness at the time of the identification procedure as to his or her confidence that the identified person is or is not the culprit. This statement should be recorded prior to any feedback by law enforcement personnel. | Met some-times | This procedure is done in some police departments, but there is no statewide policy or procedure requirement. | ||
| #15:When practicable, the police should videotape lineup procedures, including the witness' confidence statement. | Not Met | No statewide requirement. Decided by each department within each county. | ||
| #16:All police who work on homicide cases should receive periodic training in the following areas, and experts on these subjects be retained to conduct training and prepare training manuals on these topics: 1) The risks of false testimony by in-custody informants; 2) the risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses; 3) The dangers of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias; 4) The risks of wrongful convictions in homicide cases; 5) Police investigative and interrogation methods; 6) Police investigating and reporting of exculpatory evidence; 7) Forensic evidence; 8) the risks of false confessions. | Believe not met | No statewide requirement of such training. Left open to each police agency within each county. | ||
| #17:Police academies, police agencies and the Illinois Department of Corrections should include within their training curricula information on consular rights and the notification obligations to be followed during the arrest and detention of foreign nationals. | Not Met | |||
| #18: The Illinois Attorney General should remind all law enforcement agencies of their notification obligations under the Vienna Convention or Consular Relations and undertake regular reviews of the measure taken by state and local police to ensure full compliance. This could include publication of a guide based on the U.S. State Department manual. | Not Met | |||
| #19:The statute to the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board, 50 ILCS 705/6.la, should be amended to add police perjury (regardless of whether there is a criminal conviction) as a basis upon which the Board may revoke the certification of a peace officer. | Not Met | |||
| CHAPTER 3 - DNA and Forensic Testing | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #20: An independent state forensic laboratory should be created, operated by civilian personnel, with its own budget, separate from any police agency or supervision. | Not Met | |||
| #21: Adequate funding should be provided by the State of Illinois to hire and train both entry level and supervisory level forensic scientist to support expansion of DNA testing and evaluation. Support should also be provided for additional up-to-date facilities for DNA testing. The State should be prepared to outsource by sending evidence to private companies for analysis when appropriate. | ? | |||
| #22: The Commission supports Supreme Court Committee Rule 417, establishing minimum standards for DNA evidence. | ? | |||
| #23: The Federal government and the State of Illinois should provide adequate funding to enable the development of a comprehensive DNA database. | ? | |||
| #24: Illinois statutes should be amended to provide that in capital cases a defendant may apply to the court for an order to obtain a search of the DNA database to identify others who may be guilty of the crime. | Not Met | |||
| #25: In capital case forensic testing, including DNA testing pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/116(3), should be permitted where it has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence, even though the results may not be completely exonerate the defendant. | Not Met | |||
| #26: The provisions governing the Capital Litigation Trust Fund should be construed broadly so as to provide a source of finding for forensic testing pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/116-3 when the defendant faces the possibility of a capital sentence. For non-capital defendants, provisions should be made for payment of costs of forensic testing for indigents form sources other than the Capital Litigation Trust Fund. | Not Met | |||
| CHAPTER 4 - Eligibility for Capital Punishment | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #27: Eligibility factors should be reduced from 20. | Not met | RCW 10.95.020 | WA has 21 factors if eligible felonies are counted separately | WA eligibility factors: victim was law enforcement officer, corrections officer or firefighter; defendant was serving time in prison or had escaped; defendant was in jail after being convicted; defendant murdered for contract/money; defendant hired someone to commit the murder for money; murder to be in a gang; drive-by shooting; victim was judge, juror, witness, prosecuting or defense attorney, member of review board, parole or probation officer and murder was related to duties; murder to conceal crime or protect identify; more than one murder and murders were part of common scheme or plan or result of single act; in course of first degree robbery, first or second degree rape, first or second degree or residential burglary, first degree kidnapping, or first degree arson; victim was newsreporter and murder was committed to obstruct investigation or reporting activities; victim had "no contact order" against defendant; defendant and victim were family or household members and there was pattern of harassment or assault (3+) in 5 year period.;Rationale for narrowing scope of statute: large number of eligibility factors qualifies nearly every first degree murder for the death penalty, and there is no prohibition for relying on more than one factor; factors need to narrow the class of eligible cases; "natural life" is serious punishment for first degree murder; also, relatively few factors are actually used (multiple murders and course of felony); reducing number of factors should lead to more uniformity and clarity while retaining death penalty for most heinous of murders. |
| # 28: There should be only 5 eligibility factors. | Not met. | RCW 10.95.020 | WA has factors similar to 1 (peace officer/fire fighter), 2 (murder at correctional facility), 3 (2 or more victims), and 5 (defendant murders witness, judge, juror, attorney or investigator), but not 4 (torture). | 5 recommended eligibility factors: 1) murder of peace officer or firefighter killed in performance of, to prevent the performance of, or in retaliation for performing his/her duties; 2) murder of any person occurring at correctional facility; 3) murder of 2 or more persons (as per 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) and case law); 4) intentional murder involving torture (torture means intentional and depraved infliction of extreme pain for prolonged period: depraved means defendant relished the infliction of pain evidencing debasement or perversion or defendant evidenced pleasure from infliction of pain); 5) while under investigation or after being charged or convicted of a felony, defendant murders anyone involved in the investigation, prosecution or defense, including witnesses, jurors, judges, prosecutors and investigators. |
| CHAPTER 5 - Prosecutors' Selection of Cases for Capital Punishment | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #29: Illinois Attorney General and the Illinois State's Attorney Association Should adopt recommendations as to the procedures State's Attorney should follow in deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty, but these recommendations should not have the force of law, or be imposed by court rule or legislation. | Not Met | RCW 10.95.040 | RCW
10.95.040(1) directs the prosecuting attorney to file a death notice
"when there is reason to believe that there are not sufficient
mitigating circumstance to merit leniency." Each prosecutor is to do an
individual "weighing of mitigating factors." State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d
628 (1995) citing In re Harris, 111 Wn.2d 691, 763 P.2d 823 (1988)
cert. denied 490 U.S. 1075, 104 L.Ed.2d 651, 109 S.Ct. 2088 (1989). There are, however, no standards or procedures elucidating the criteria to be considered in determine whether or not to seek the death penalty in a particular case. | |
| #30: The death penalty sentencing statute should be revised to include a mandatory review of death eligibility undertaken by a state-wide review committee. | Not Met | See Recommendation #28. | ||
| #31: The Commission supports Supreme Court Rule 416©, requiring that the state announce its intention to seek the death penalty, and the factors to be relied upon, as soon as practicable but in no event later than 120 days after arraingment. | Met | RCW 10.95.040(2) | A notice of special sentencing proceeding shall be filed and served on the defendant or the defendant's attorney within thirty after the defendant's arraignment upon the charge of aggravated first degree murder unless the court, for good cause shown, extends or reopens the period for filing and service of the notice. | The aggravating factors which the State will rely upon are generally set forth in the original complaint filed at the time of arraignment. |
| CHAPTER 6 - Trial Judges | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| Still pending information | ||||
| #32: Illinois Supreme Court should give consideration to encouraging the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (AOIC) to undertake a concerted effort to educate trial judges throughout the state in the parameters of the Capital Crimes Litigation Act and the funding sources available for the defense of capital cases. | Not met | The Illinois Supreme Court already undertakes training efforts for all judges in the state (see Rule 43 below). This recommendation supports specific training for judges to insure they understand the parameters of the Capital Crimes Litigation Act and the funding sources available for defense. | ||
| #33: Commission supports the provisions of the new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 43 as to "Seminars on Capital Cases." Illinois Supreme Court should be encouraged to undertake more action as outlined in this report to insure the highest quality training and support are provided to any judge trying a capital case. Commission also supports the revised Committee Comments to new Supreme Court Rule 43 which contemplates that capital case training will occur prior to the time a judge hears a capital case. The Supreme Court should be encouraged to consider going further and requiring that judges be trained before presiding over a capital case. | Not met | Rule
43: (a) In order to insure the highest degree of judicial competency
during a capital trial and sentencing hearing, the Judicial Conference
shall establish Capital Litigation Regional Seminars for judges that
may as part of their designated duties preside over capital litigation.
The capital litigation seminars should include, but not be limited to,
the judge's role in capital cases, motion practice, current procedures
in jury selection, substantive and procedural death penalty case law,
confessions, and the admissibility of evidence in the areas of
scientific trace materials, genetics, and DNA analysis. Seminars on
capital cases shall be held twice a year. (b) Any circuit court judge
or associate judge who in his current assignment may be called upon to
preside over a capital case shall attend a Capital Litigation Regional
Seminar at least once every two years. Rule 43 Comments: … It is contemplated that any judge who presides over a capital case on or after the effective date of paragraph (b) of the rule will have prior thereto attend a Capital Litigation Regional Seminar. | ||
| #34: In light of the changes in Illinois Supreme Court rules governing the discovery process in capital cases, the Supreme Court should give consideration to ways the Court can insure that particularized training is provided to trial judges with respect to implementation of the new rules governing capital litigation, especially with respect to the management of the discovery process. | Not met | |||
| #35: All judges who are trying capital cases should receive periodic training in the following areas (see comments), and experts on these subjects be retained to conduct training and prepare training manuals on these topics. | Not met | Recommended Specific Topics: 1. risks of false testimony by jailhouse informants; 2. risks of false testimony by accomplices; 3. dangers of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias; 4. risks of wrongful convictions; 5. police investigation and interrogation methods; 6. police investigating and reporting of exculpatory evidence; 7. forensic evidence; 8. risks of false confessions. | ||
| #36: The Illinois Supreme Court, and the AOIC, should consider development of and provide sufficient funding for state-wide materials to train judges in capital cases, and additional staff to provide research support. | Not met | Trial judges need to have access to resources and tools to support them in capital trials, including: development of state-wide bench manual targeted specifically at capital cases; increase staffing levels to insure that trial judges have access to assisted legal research; and improved access to computerized legal research and support training for judges in how to use these research tools. | ||
| #37: The Illinois Supreme Court should consider ways in which information regarding relevant case law and other resources can be widely disseminated to those trying capital cases, through development of a digest of applicable law by the Supreme Court and wider publication of the outline of issues developed by the State Appellate Defender or the State Appellate Prosecutor and/or Attorney General. | ? | |||
| CHAPTER 7 Trial Lawyers | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| # 40: Supports Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416(d) regarding qualifications for counsel. | Somewhat met | SPRC 2 | WA has qualifications for defense and appellate counsel as per SPRC 2: At least two lawyers shall be appointed for the trial and also for the direct appeal. The trial court shall retain responsibility for appointing counsel for trial. The Supreme Court shall appoint counsel for the direct appeal. Notwithstanding RAP 15.2(f) and (h), the Supreme Court will determine all motions to withdraw as counsel on appeal. All counsel for trial and appeal must have demonstrated the proficiency and commitment to quality representation which is appropriate to a capital case. At least one counsel at trial must have five years' experience in the practice of criminal law, be familiar with and experienced in the utilization of expert witnesses and evidence, and be learned in the law of capital punishment by virtue of training or experience. At least one counsel on appeal must have three years' experience in the field of criminal appellate law and be learned in the law of capital punishment by virtue of training or experience. A list of attorneys qualified for appointment in death penalty trials and for appeals will be recruited and maintained by a panel created by the Supreme Court. In appointing counsel for trial and on appeal, the trial court and the Supreme Court will consider this list. However, the courts will have the final discretion in the appointment of counsel in capital cases. |
Illinois has qualifications for both defense and prosecution: Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416(d) Representation by Counsel. In all cases wherein the State has given notice of its intention to seek the death penalty, or has failed to provide any notice pursuant to paragraph (c), the trial judge shall appoint an indigent defendant two qualified counsel who have been certified as members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar pursuant to Rule 714, or appoint the public defender, who shall assign two qualified counsel who have been certified as members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar. In the event the defendant is represented by private counsel, the trial judge shall likewise insure that counsel is a member of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar. The trial judge shall likewise insure that counsel for the State, unless said counsel is the Attorney General or the duly elected or appointed State's Attorney of the county of venue, is a member of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar SPRC 2 does not require two qualified counsel be appointed. Although at least two attorneys must be appointed to represent a capital defendant at trial, at least one must be qualifed. |
| #41: Those appearing as lead or co-counsel must be admitted to capital litigation bar as per new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 701(b). | Somewhat met | WA does not have a "Capital Litigation Trial Bar." | See Recommendation #40. | |
| #42: Supports Illinois Supreme Court Rule 714 imposing trial bar standards and rules for admission to Capital Litigation Trial Bar. | Somewhat met | SPRC 2 | WA does not have a "Capital Litigation Trial Bar," but does have qualifications for defense counsel. | See Recommendation #40 |
| #43: State Appellate Defender should facilitate dissemination of information with respect to qualified defense counsel. | Met | SPRC 2 | SPRC 2: …A list of attorneys qualified for appointment in death penalty trials and for appeals will be recruited and maintained by a panel created by the Supreme Court. In appointing counsel for trial and on appeal, the trial court and the Supreme Court will consider this list. | Illinois Supreme Court Rule 701(b) Any person admitted to practice law in this State is privileged to practice in every court in Illinois. No court shall by rule or by practice abridge or deny this privilege by requiring the retaining of local counsel or the maintaining of a local office for the service of notices. However, no person, except the Attorney General or the duly appointed or elected State's Attorney of the county of venue, may appear as lead or co-counsel for either the State or defense in a capital case unless he or she is a member of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar provided for in Rule 714. (Italicized amendment became effective 3/1/01.) |
| #44: Mandatory training for prosecutors and defenders should be well funded to insure high quality. | Somewhat met | Death Penalty Assistance Center provides non-mandatory training to capital defense attorneys. The funding is limited and subject to change, therefore, no assurances it will be "well funded to insure high quality." Presently, there is no money allotted or earmarked for training seminars, instead the costs must come from public defenders' budget or in the case of private counsel, from counsel's own business expense. Sometimes the money is reimbursed but is decided on a case-by-case basis and from county-to-county. | Illinois Supreme Court Rule 714. Capital Litigation Trial Bar
| |
| #45: Members of Capital Trial Bar (prosecutors and defenders) should receive periodic training in specific topics by experts who also prepare training manuals. | Somewhat met | Death Penalty Assistance Center provides training to defense counsel. This training is not mandatory. See also Recommendation #44 (costs is limited an often not provided) | In Illinois, the
State Appellate Defender is authorized as per 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) to
provide support and training to trial counsel in capital cases via its
Death Penalty Trial Assistance Division: (c) The State Appellate Defender may: (5) in cases in which a death sentence is an authorized disposition, provide trial counsel with the assistance of expert witnesses, investigators, and mitigation specialists from funds appropriated to the State Appellate Defender specifically for that purpose by the General Assembly. The Office of State Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to serve as trial counsel in capital cases. (d) For each State fiscal year, the State Appellate Defender shall appear before the General Assembly and request appropriations to be made from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund to the State Treasurer for the purpose of providing defense assistance in capital cases outside of Cook County. The State Appellate Defender may appear before the General Assembly at other times during the State's fiscal year to request supplemental appropriations from the Trust Fund to the State Treasurer. | |
| CHAPTER 8 - Pretrial Proceedings | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #46: The Commission supports new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416 (e) which permits discovery depositions in capital cases on leave of court for good cause. | Somewhat met | CrR 4.6 | Washington allows depositions in criminal cases, but has no rule for capital cases specifically. CrR 4.6 DEPOSITIONS: a) When Taken. Upon a showing that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing or if a witness refuses to discuss the case with either counsel and that his testimony is material and that it is necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice, the court at any time after the filing of an indictment or information may upon motion of a party and notice to the parties order that his testimony be taken by deposition and that any designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same time and place. b) Notice of Taking. The party at whose instance a deposition is to be taken shall give to every other party reasonable written notice of the time and place for taking the deposition. The notice shall state the name and address of each person to be examined. On motion of a party upon whom the notice is served, the court for cause shown may extend or shorten the time and may change the place of taking. c) How Taken. A deposition shall be taken in the manner provided in civil actions. No deposition shall be used in evidence against any defendant who has not had notice of and an opportunity to participate in or be present at the taking thereof. d) Use. Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as witness, or as substantive evidence under circumstances permitted by the Rules of Evidence. e) Objections to Admissibility. Objections to receiving in evidence a deposition or part thereof may be made as provided in civil actions. |
Prior to this rule, Illinois generally did not permit depositions in criminal cases. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416: Procedures in Capital Cases: (e) Discovery Depositions in Capital Cases. In capital cases discovery depositions may be taken in accordance with the following provisions:
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| #47: The Commission supports the provision of new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416(f) mandating case management conferences in capital cases. | Not met | CrR 4.5 | Washington
generally requires an omnibus hearing for criminal cases, but does not
have specific rules for case management of capital cases. CrR 4.5 OMNIBUS HEARING
|
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416: Procedures in Capital Cases: (f) Case Management Conference. No later than 120 days after the defendant has been arraigned or no later than 60 days after the State has disclosed its intention to seek the death penalty, whichever date occurs earlier, the court shall hold a case management conference. Counsel who will conduct the trial personally shall attend such conference. At the conference, the court shall do the following:
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| #48: The Commission supports Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416(g), which requires that a certificate be filed by the state indicating that a conference has been held with all those persons who participated in the investigation or trial preparation of the case, and that all information required to be disclosed has been disclosed. | Not met | CrR 4.5 | Washington
generally requires an omnibus hearing for criminal cases, but does not
have specific rules for case management of capital cases. CrR 4.5 OMNIBUS HEARING (h) Memorandum. At the conclusion of the hearing, a summary memorandum shall be made indicating disclosure made, rulings and orders of the court, stipulations, and any other matters determined or pending. Such summary memorandum shall be in substantially the following form: See CrR 4.5 for form. |
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416: Procedures in Capital Cases: (g) In all capital cases the State shall file with the court not less than 14 days before the date set for trial, or at such other time as the court may direct, a certificate stating that the State's Attorney or Attorney General has conferred with the individuals involved in the investigation and trial preparation of the case and represents that all material or information required to be disclosed pursuant to Rule 412 has been tendered to defense counsel. This certificate shall be filed in open court in the defendant's presence. (h) In all capital cases the defense shall file with the court not less than 14 days before the date set for trial, or at such other time as the court may direct, a readiness certificate signed by both lead and co-counsel stating that they have met with the defendant and fully discussed the discovery, the State's case and possible defenses, and have reviewed the evidence and defenses which may mitigate the consequences for the defendant at trial and at sentencing. This certificate shall be filed in open court in the defendant's presence. |
| #49: The Illinois Supreme Court should adopt a rule defining "exculpatory evidence" in order to provide guidance to counsel in making appropriate disclosures. | Not met | CrR 4.7 | CrR 4.7(3) states, "Except as is otherwise provided as to protective orders, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defendant's counsel any material or information within the prosecuting attorney's knowledge which tends to negate defendant's guilt as to the offense charged." CrR 4.7(4) limits this obligation to "material and information within the knowledge, possession or control of members of the prosecuting attorney's staff." | The commission recommended the following definition: Exculpatory information includes, but may be limited to, all information that is material and favorable to the defendant because it tends to: 1) Cast doubt on defendant's guilt as to any essential element in any count in the indictment or information; 2) Cast doubt on the admissibility of evidence that the state anticipates offering in its case-in-chief that might be subject to a motion to suppress or exclude; 3) Cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of any evidence that the state anticipates offering in its case-in-chief or; 4) Diminish the degree of the defendant's culpability or mitigate the defendant's potential sentence. |
| #50: Illinois law should require that any discussions with a witness or the representative of a witness concerning benefits, potential benefits or detriments conferred on a witness by any prosecutor, police official, corrections official or anyone else, should be reduced to writing, and should be disclosed to the defense in advance of trial. | Not Met | CrR 4.7 | CrR 4.7 sets out general discovery requirements, but there is nothing specific as to benefits or detriments conferred on a witness by the prosecutor, police official, or anyone else. | |
| #51: Whenever the state may introduce the testimony of an in-custody informant who has agreed to testify for the prosecution in a capital case to a statement allegedly made by the defendant, at either the guilt or sentencing phase, the state should promptly inform the defense as to the identification and background of the witness. | Not Met | See Recommendation #51 | ||
| #52(a) Prior to trial, the trial judge shall
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the reliability and
admissibility of the in-custody informant's testimony at either the
guilt or sentencing phase (b) At the pre-trial evidentiary hearing , the trial judge shall use the following standards: The prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that the witness' testimony is reliable. The trial judge may consider the following factors, as well as any other factors bearing on the witness' credibility: 1) the specific statement which the witness will testify; 2) The time and place, and other circumstances regarding the alleged statement; 3) Any deal or inducement made by the informant and the police or prosecutor in exchange for the witness' testimony; 4) the criminal history of the witness; 5) whether the witness has ever recanted his/her testimony; 6) Other cases in which the witness testified to alleged confessions by others; 7) Any other known evidence that may attest to or diminish the credibility of the witness, including the presence or absence of any relationship between the accused and witness. (c ) The state may file an interlocutory appeal from a ruling suppressing the testimony of an in-custody informant, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604. |
Not Met | ER 103 | ER
103 directs the trial court to conduct proceedings be conducted so as
to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by
any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking
questions in the hearing of the jury. This rule only addresses the issue of admissibility; not reliability as suggested in Recommendation #52. |
|
| #54: The Commission makes no recommendation about whether or not plea negotiations should be restricted with respect to the death penalty. | N/A | |||
| CHAPTER 9 - Guilt-Innocence Phase | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #55: Expert testimony with respect to the problems associated with eyewitness testimony may be helpful in appropriate cases. Determinations as to whether such evidence may be admitted should be resolved by the trial judge on a case by case basis. | Somewhat followed | Case law/ ER 700 | ER 702 requires expert testimony meet Frye. Also see State v. Coe, 109 Wn.2d 832: The admission of expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony is a decision within the trial court's discretion. | |
| #56: Jury instructions with respect to eyewitness testimony should enumerate factors for the jury to consider, including the difficulty of making a cross-racial identification. The current version of IPI is to step in the right direction, but should be improved. | Not Met | WPIC 6.01 is limited to "sole judges of credibility of the witness and what weight is to be given to the testimony of each. In considering the testimony of any witness, you may take into account the opportunity and ability of the witness to observe, the witness' memory and manner while testifying, any interest, bias, or prejudice the witness may have, the reasonableness of the testimony of witness considered in light of all the evidence, and any other factors that bear on believability and weight." | There is no WPIC instruction that specifically enumerate factors to consider, especially dealing with the difficulty of making cross-racial identifications. | |
| #57: The Committee on the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal should consider a jury instruction providing a special caution with respect to the reliability of the testimony of in-custody informants. | Not Met | WPIC 6.05 does provide a special caution but is limited to the "testimony of accomplice". "The testimony of an accomplice, given on behalf of the plaintiff, should be subjected to careful examination in light of the other evidence in the case, and should be aced upon with great caution. You should not find the defendant guilty upon such testimony alone unless, after carefully considering the testimony, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of its truth." | No WPIC dealing specifically with in-custody informants. | |
| #58: Suggestion is to supplement IPI Criminal 3.06 and 3.07 to add language when the defendant's statement is not recorded. The additional language is: You should pay particular attention to whether or not the statement is recorded, and if it is, what method was used to record it. Generally, an electronic recording that contains the defendant's actual voice or a statement written by the defendant is more reliable than non-recorded summary. | Not met | WPIC 6.41 states: You may give such weight and credibility to any alleged confession or admission of the defendant as you see fit, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances. | There is not language that particularly addresses confessions or admissions that are (or are not) recorded. | |
| #59: Illinois courts should continue to reject the results of polygraph examinations during innocence/guilt phase of capital trials. | Met | Case law | State v. Renfro, 28 Wn.App. 248 (1981): Polygraph examinations are generally not admissible unless both parties agree to its admissibility before the test is administered and then only if the court determines other safeguards are present. See also Subia v. Riveland, 104 Wn.App. 105 (2001): Court did allow the polygraph be admitted without a stipulation when the evidence relates to an issue other than guilt. | |
| CHAPTER 10 - The Sentencing Phase | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #60: The Commission supports the new amendment to Supreme Court Rule 411, which make the rules of discovery applicable to the sentencing phase of capital cases. | Met | SPRC Rule 4 | SPRC Rule 4: Before the guilt phase of the trial begins, pursuant to a schedule set by the court, both parties shall provide discovery, pursuant to CrR 4.7(a) and (b) of evidence that they anticipate offering at the special sentencing proceeding. The trial court has discretion, in accordance with CrR 4.7(h)(4), to defer disclosure of all or part of the defendant's penalty phase evidence until the guilt phase has been completed. This discovery shall, if necessary, be supplemented pursuant to CrR 4.7(h)(2). | |
| #61: The mitigating factors considered by the jury in the death penalty sentencing scheme should be expanded to include the defendant's history of extreme emotional or physical abuse, and that the defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity. | Not Met | RCW 10.95.070 | RCW
10.95.070(2) discusses the defendant's extreme mental disturbance, but
is limited to "whether the murder was committed while the defendant was
under extreme mental disturbance." RCW 10.95.070(6) sets out mitigation
as to the defendant was substantially impaired as a result of a mental
disease or defect. This provision, however, is also limited to "at the
time of the murder" and whether the mental disease affected the
defendant's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her
conduct or to conform his or her conduct. There are no statutory
mitigating factors addressing the "history of physical abuse." The Illinois recommendation does not make such limitations, but expands to the defendant's "history of extreme emotional or physical abuse." | |
| #62 The defendant shall have the right to make a statement on his own behalf at during the aggravation/mitigation phase, without being subject to cross-examination. | Met | Case law | If the defendant's statement is a plea of mercy and not intended to advance or dispute facts, then it is allocution and not subject to cross-examination. If the statement does seek to advance or dispute facts, then the defendant is subject to cross-examination. See State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829 (1991) and State v. Mak, 105 Wn.2d 692 | |
| #63: The jury should be instructed as to the alternatives sentences that may be imposed in the event that the death penalty is not imposed. | Met | WPIC | WPIC 31.06: "If you unanimously answer "yes," the sentence will be death. If you unanimously answer 'no,' or if you are unable to agree on an unanimous answer, the sentence will be life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole. A person sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole shall not have that sentence suspended, deferred, or commuted by a judicial officer . . . | |
| #64: Illinois courts should continue to reject the results of polygraph examinations during the sentencing phase of capital trials. | Not Met | Case law | Under Rupe v. Wood, the trial court's refusal to admit the results of the State's principal witness had failed the polygraphs was error. 863 F.Supp. 1315 (1994). Also, under RCW 10.95.060(3) "any relevant evidence . . .including hearsay evidence" shall be admitted suggests that defendant's results in a polygraph test could be admitted in a penalty phase. | |
| CHAPTER 11 - Imposition of Sentence | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #65: Statute should make clear that jury should weigh the factors in the case and reach its own independent conclusion about whether the death penalty should be imposed. | RCW 10.95.060 | RCW
10.95.060(4): Upon conclusion of the evidence and argument at the
special sentencing proceeding, the jury shall retire to deliberate upon
the following question: "Having in mind the crime of which the
defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit
leniency?" In order to return an affirmative answer to the question posed by this subsection, the jury must so find unanimously. **The commission is concerned that the language used in the statute is confusing to juries: 1) a jury may imply that it has no choice about whether to impose the death penalty, 2) the jury may conclude that the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory unless mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors, 3) the jury may not clearly understand that if any one juror finds that a mitigating factor exists that alone is sufficient to warrant imposition of a sentence other than death. |
Statute
should be amended as follows: If the jury determines unanimously, after
weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the
appropriate sentence…. Statute currently reads: If the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. Unless the jury unanimously finds that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment. | |
| #66: If the judge does not concur on the record with the imposition of the death penalty by the jury, the sentence shall be natural life (assuming new scheme with five eligibility factors). | Not met | RCW 10.95.080 | RCW 10.95.080(1): If a jury answers affirmatively the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4), or when a jury is waived as allowed by RCW 10.95.050(2) and the trial court answers affirmatively the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4), the defendant shall be sentenced to death. The trial court may not suspend or defer the execution or imposition of the sentence. | **Requiring the concurrence of the trial judge on sentencing addresses the issues of residual doubt and proportionality. |
| #67: If death is not found to be the appropriate sentence, the mandatory alternative should be natural life (assuming new scheme with five eligibility factors). | Somewhat met | RCW 10.95.080 | RCW
10.95.080(2): If the jury does not return an affirmative answer to the
question posed in RCW 10.95.060(4), the defendant shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment as provided in RCW 10.95.030(1). RCW 10.95.030(1): Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, any person convicted of the crime of aggravated first degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole. A person sentenced to life imprisonment under this section shall not have that sentence suspended, deferred, or commuted by any judicial officer and the indeterminate sentence review board or its successor may not parole such prisoner nor reduce the period of confinement in any manner whatsoever including but not limited to any sort of good-time calculation. The department of social and health services or its successor or any executive official may not permit such prisoner to participate in any sort of release or furlough program. |
**This recommendation would be met if WA adopted the new scheme of five eligibility factors. |
| #68: There should be a statute that prohibits the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants. | Met | RCW 10.95.030 | RCW
10.95.030(2): If, pursuant to a special sentencing proceeding held
under RCW 10.95.050, the trier of fact finds that there are not
sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence
shall be death. In no case, however, shall a person be sentenced to
death if the person was mentally retarded at the time the crime was
committed, under the definition of mental retardation set forth in (a)
of this subsection. A diagnosis of mental retardation shall be
documented by a licensed psychiatrist or licensed psychologist
designated by the court, who is an expert in the diagnosis and
evaluation of mental retardation. The defense must establish mental
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence and the court must make
a finding as to the existence of mental retardation.
|
**The commission recommended the Tennessee statute as a model. The Tennessee statute defines mental retardation as: 1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional IQ of 70 or below; 2) deficits in adaptive behavior; and 3) the mental retardation must have been manifested during the development period, or by 18 years of age. Tenn.Code 39-13-203(a). |
| #69: There should be a statute that provides: A) the uncorroborated testimony of an in-custody informant witness concerning the confession or admission of the defendant may not be the sole basis for the imposition of the death penalty; B) convictions for murder based on the testimony of a single eyewitness or accomplice without any other corroboration should not be death eligible under any circumstances. | Not met | |||
| CHAPTER 12 - Proceedings following conviction and sentence | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #70: Proportionality Review: On direct appeal, Supreme Court should consider whether sentence was arbitrary, proper and proportionate. | Met | RCW 10.95.100-150 | WA
has mandatory review of death sentence by Supreme Court. Trial court
must submit detailed report within 30 days of sentence. Supreme Court
must answer 4 questions.
RCW 10.95.130(2): (2) …the supreme court of Washington shall determine: (a) Whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the affirmative finding to the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4); and (b) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. For the purposes of this subsection, "similar cases" means cases reported in the Washington Reports or Washington Appellate Reports since January 1, 1965, in which the judge or jury considered the imposition of capital punishment regardless of whether it was imposed or executed, and cases in which reports have been filed with the supreme court under RCW 10.95.120; (c) Whether the sentence of death was brought about through passion or prejudice; and (d) Whether the defendant was mentally retarded within the meaning of RCW 10.95.030(2). |
|
| #71: Prosecutor should be required (via RPC) to have a continuing obligation to make timely disclosure of evidence that tends to negate guilt or mitigate sentence. | Not Met | RPC 3.8 | WA RPC, Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, Rule 3.8 (d): (d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. |
Illinois RPC, Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, Rule 3.8(c): (c) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the degree of the offense. Following conviction, a public prosecutor or other government lawyer has the continuing obligation to make timely disclosure to the counsel for the defendant or to the defendant if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the defendant's capital sentence. For purposes of this post-conviction disclosure responsibility "timely disclosure" contemplates that the prosecutor or other government lawyer should have the opportunity to investigate matters related to the new evidence. (The recommended amendment of additional language is in italics.) |
| #72: Post-conviction petition should be filed within 6 months of mandate of direct appeal (for capital cases). | Met | RCW 10.73.090 | WA has a one year time limit following mandate: RCW 10.73.090. Collateral attack--One year time limit (1) No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. … (3) For the purposes of this section, a judgment becomes final on the last of the following dates: a) The date it is filed with the clerk of the trial court; b) The date that an appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction or; The date that the United States Supreme Court denies a timely petition for certiorari to review a decision affirming the conviction on direct appeal. The filing of a motion to reconsider denial of certiorari does not prevent a judgment from becoming final. (There are a number of exceptions to the one-year rule see RCW 10.73.100.) But see RAP 16.22 Filings of Briefs in Capital Cases: RAP 16.22(b): The personal restraint petition shall be filed within 180 days after the appointment of counsel or the court's determination that counsel will not be appointed. The response to a personal restraint petition shall be filed within 120 days after service of the petition. |
Commission
stressed that, although concern over delay is reasonable, Illinois'
requirements were too confusing and in some cases would require a
petition to be filed before a direct appeal was final.
725 ILCS 5/122-1. Petition in the trial court (c) No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline for the filing of the defendant's brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. |
| #73: Evidentiary hearing on petition should convene within one year of when petition is filed (for capital cases). | Not met | RCW 7.36.120 RAP 16.11-12 |
Washington
also allows for "Superior Court Habeas Corpus." RCW 7.36.120 requires
"The court or judge shall thereupon proceed in a summary way to hear
and determine the cause, and if no legal cause be shown for the
restraint or for the continuation thereof, shall discharge the party."
The superior court may transfer the habeas corpus proceeding to the
Court of Appeals for consideration as a PRP. Defendants can also
receive post-conviction relief by filing a PRP directly with the
appellate court. A PRP can be remanded to superior court if an
evidentiary (reference) hearing is necessary. Neither RCW nor RAP imposes a time limit within which the evidentiary hearing must be held. But see RCW 10.95.150. Time limit for appellate review of death sentence and filing opinion: In all cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed, the appellate review, if any, and sentence review to or by the supreme court of Washington shall be decided and an opinion on the merits shall be filed within one year of receipt by the clerk of the supreme court of Washington of the verbatim report of proceedings and clerk's papers filed under RCW 10.95.110. If this time requirement is not met, the chief justice of the supreme court of Washington shall state on the record the extraordinary and compelling circumstances causing the delay and the facts supporting such circumstances. A failure to comply with the time requirements of this subsection shall in no way preclude the ultimate execution of a sentence of death. |
Illinois
Post-Conviction Hearing Act allows for post-conviction relief from the
trial court. The court must examine the petition within 90 days and the
state must answer the petition, unless it is dismissed, within 30 days.
The Commission was concerned that, "Beyond those basic time limits,
there are no provisions which place any requirements on the trial court
to commence or conclude the post-conviction proceedings within any
particular time frame." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1. (a) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section. 725 ILCS 5/122-5. Within 30 days after the making of an order pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 122-2.1, or within such further time as the court may set, the State shall answer or move to dismiss. |
| #74: There should be an exception to the time limit for post-conviction relief in cases where there is newly discovered of actual innocence. Court may make an initial determination regarding frivolousness. | Met | RCW 10.73.100(1) | RCW
10.73.100 Collateral attack--When one year limit not applicable: The
time limit specified in RCW 10.73.090 does not apply to a petition or
motion that is based solely on one or more of the following grounds: (1) Newly discovered evidence, if the defendant acted with reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence and filing the petition or motion. |
Under Illinois case law, due process requires this exception but the Commission recommended amending the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to provide clearly that such a proceeding could be commenced at any time after conviction without regard for procedural time limits. |
| #75: After exhaustion of appeals, a clemency petition must be filed within 30 days of order setting execution date. | Not met | WA
does not have this requirement. Article 3, § 9 of the Washington State
Constitution grants the governor the power to pardon. RCW 10.01.120
specifically grants the governor the power to commute a death sentence
to life imprisonment. RCW 9.94A.885 establishes a clemency and pardons
board and imposes limitations only on the board. Art 3, § 9. Pardoning Power: The pardoning power shall be vested in the governor under such regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law. RCW 10.01.120: Whenever a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the governor shall have power to commute such sentence to imprisonment for life at hard labor; and in all cases in which the governor is authorized to grant pardons or commute sentence of death, he may, upon the petition of the person convicted, commute a sentence or grant a pardon, upon such conditions, and with such restrictions, and under such limitations as he may think proper; and he may issue his warrant to all proper officers to carry into effect such pardon or commutation, which warrant shall be obeyed and executed, instead of the sentence, if any, which was originally given. The governor may also, on good cause shown, grant respites or reprieves from time to time as he may think proper. 9.94A.885. Clemency and pardons board--Petitions for review-Hearing: 1) The clemency and pardons board shall receive petitions from individuals, organizations, and the department for review and commutation of sentences and pardoning of offenders in extraordinary cases, and shall make recommendations thereon to the governor.; 2) The board shall receive petitions from individuals or organizations for the restoration of civil rights lost by operation of state law as a result of convictions for federal offenses or out-of-state felonies. The board may issue certificates of restoration limited to the elective rights to vote and to engage in political office. Any certifications granted by the board must be filed with the secretary of state to be effective. In all other cases, the board shall make recommendations to the governor.; 3) The board shall not recommend that the governor grant clemency under subsection (1) of this section until a public hearing has been held on the petition. The prosecuting attorney of the county where the conviction was obtained shall be notified at least thirty days prior to the scheduled hearing that a petition has been filed and the date and place at which the hearing on the petition will be held. The board may waive the thirty-day notice requirement in cases where it determines that waiver is necessary to permit timely action on the petition. A copy of the petition shall be sent to the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney shall make reasonable efforts to notify victims, survivors of victims, witnesses, and the law enforcement agency or agencies that conducted the investigation, of the date and place of the hearing. Information regarding victims, survivors of victims, or witnesses receiving this notice are confidential and shall not be available to the offender. The board shall consider written, oral, audio, or videotaped statements regarding the petition received, personally or by representation, from the individuals who receive notice pursuant to this section. This subsection is intended solely for the guidance of the board. Nothing in this section is intended or may be relied upon to create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any person. |
||
| CHAPTER 13 - Funding | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #76: Leaders in both executive and legislative branch should significantly improve the resources to the criminal justice system in order to permit the meaningful implementation of reforms in capital cases. | Not Met | |||
| #77: The Capital Crimes Litigation Act, 725 ILCS 124/1, et.seq., which is the state statute containing the Capital Litigation Trust Fund and other provisions, should be reauthorized by the General Assembly. | Not Met | |||
| #78: The Commission supports the concept articulated in the statute governing the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, that adequate compensation be provided to trial counsel in capital cases for both time and expense, and encourages regular compensation of the hourly rates authorized under the statute to reflect the actual rates of private attorneys. | Not Met | There are no statutes that set out "regular reconsideration of the hourly rates authorized under the statute to reflect the actual market rates of private attorneys." There are not statewide hourly rates, instead each county determines the hourly rate it will pay to capital defense attorneys. This practice creates discrepancy of the hourly rate from county to county. | ||
| #79: The provision of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund should be construed as broadly as possible to insure that public defenders, particularly those in rural parts of the state, can effectively use its provisions to secure additional counsel and reimbursement of all reasonable trial related expenses in capital cases. | Not Met | |||
| #80: The work f State Appellate Defender's office in providing statewide trial support in Capital Cases should continue, and funds should be appropriated for this purpose. | Not Met | Washington State does not have a State Appellate Defender's office. | ||
| #81: The Commission supports the recommendations in the Report of the Task Force on Professional Practice in the Illinois Justice System to reduce the burden of student loans for those entering criminal justice careers and improve salary levels and pension contributions for those in the system in order to insure retention of qualified counsel. | Not Met | |||
| #82: Adequate funding should be provided by the State of Illinois to all Illinois police agencies to pay for electronic recording equipment, personnel and facilities needed to conduct electronic recordings in homicide cases. Also adequate funding to hire and train both entry level and supervisory level forensic scientist to support expansion of DNA testing and evaluation. | Not met | |||
| CHAPTER 14 - General Recommendations | ||||
| Recommendation | Met/ Not Met |
Source | WA | Comments |
| #83: The Commission strongly urges consideration of ways to broaden the application of many of the recommendations made by the Commission to improve the criminal justice system as a whole. | Not met | |||
| #84: Information should be collected at the trial level with respect to prosecutions of first degree murder cases, by trial judges, which would detail information that could prove valuable in assessing whether the death penalty is, in fact, being fairly applied. Data should be collected on a form which provides details about the trial, the background of the defendant, and the basis for the sentence imposed. The forms should be collected by the administrative officer of the Illinois Courts, and the form from an individual case should be a public record. Data collected from the forms should be public, and should be maintained in a public access database by the Criminal Justice Information Authority. | Somewhat Met | RCW 10.95.120 | RCW 10.95.120 does mandate that trial courts, within thirty days after the entry of judgment and sentence of aggravated murder, submit a report to the clerk of the Supreme Court of Washington. The pre-printed form does include information suggested in the recommendation. | Although RCW 10.95.120 does set out a process to collect this data, there have been systematic problems with its application. Many of the reports are vague, incomplete, or never filled out in a timely matter. There is also no public database with this information. |
| #85: Judges should be reminded of their obligation under Cannon 3 to report violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct by prosecutors and defense lawyers. | Met/ Not Met (individually based) |
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Disciplinary Counsel - WSBA
