To identify the elements of an offense that were the subject of a prior conviction, the categorical analysis looks only to the statutory definition of the offense and not to the underlying circumstances. If the person actually committed assault but was able to plead to trespass, the analysis will only focus on the elements of the offense of trespass. Begin by looking only at the elements of the crime as set forth in the statute and the case law of the jurisdiction applying the statute (i.e., not information in the record of conviction). The minimum or least offensive conduct that can violate the statute must involve the adverse immigration consequence—e.g., be a moral turpitude offense or aggravated felony—in order for a conviction under the statute to have that consequence. In other words, the offense qualifies as an aggravated felony, “if and only if the ‘full range of conduct’ covered by [the criminal statute] falls within the meaning of that term.”¹³²

Example: Mr. Ye was convicted of burglarizing a car under Calif. P.C. §460(b), an offense similar to vehicle prowling under RCW 9A.52.095-100. To determine whether the conviction was an aggravated felony as a “crime of violence,” (COV) the court considered the most minimal conduct that could violate the statute. Simply reaching into a car through an open window and removing an article could be a violation of the statute, even though it does not satisfy the requisite threat or use of force necessary to constitute a COV as defined in 18 USC 16. Thus, the court found that the offense was not a COV.¹³³

^{132 U.S. v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999)(citation omitted). The BIA has long followed this rule in determining what constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude and also applies it to aggravated felonies and other grounds. See, e.g., Matter of Palacios, 22 I. & N. Dec. 434 (BIA 1998); Matter of Alcantar, 20 I & N.801 (BIA 1994); Matter of Magallanes, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 1998); and cases cited infra n. 134 & 135.}

^{133 See Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2000)}